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Why Great Powers Launch Destructive Cyber Operations and What to Do About It

[comment]

Weber, Valentin

Corporate Editor
Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V.

Abstract

2010 was a seminal year. Stuxnet, an American-Israeli cyber operation sabotaged Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges. It became publicly known as the first cyber operation in history that destroyed physical objects. This operation had the clear goal of degrading Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilit... view more

2010 was a seminal year. Stuxnet, an American-Israeli cyber operation sabotaged Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges. It became publicly known as the first cyber operation in history that destroyed physical objects. This operation had the clear goal of degrading Iran’s uranium enrichment capability, but in general there has been little research as to why hegemons launch destructive cyber operations. This brief argues that the main motivations are threefold: territorial conquest, threat prevention, and retaliatory actions. Key Findings: Iran, North Korea, South Korea, Ukraine and Taiwan have been the main targets of destructive great power cyber operations. For the US, future targets will possibly be limited to countries that aim to acquire nuclear weapons - Iran and North Korea. Given ongoing border disputes, China and Russia will likely target neighboring countries with such destructive campaigns - for China those are Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan, and for Russia they are Georgia, Moldova, and Japan. To prevent destructive cyber operations, Germany and other EU states have been engaged in cyber capacity building and threat-intelligence sharing across continents. But Berlin needs to set priorities. When it comes to combatting state-sponsored cyber campaigns, Germany should deepen ties with non-EU countries that have been or likely will be targets of damaging rather than merely disruptive operations, i.e., in Southeast Asia, East Asia, the Caucasus, and Southeast Europe.... view less

Keywords
great power; information technology; threat; territorial gain; retaliation; United States of America; Israel; Iran; North Korea; South Korea; Ukraine; Taiwan; China; Vietnam; Philippines; Japan; Russia; Georgia; Moldova; Federal Republic of Germany; EU; defense policy; security policy; international relations; Internet

Classification
Peace and Conflict Research, International Conflicts, Security Policy
Interactive, electronic Media

Document language
English

Publication Year
2023

City
Berlin

Page/Pages
7 p.

Series
DGAP Policy Brief, 33

ISSN
2198-5936

Status
Published Version; reviewed

Licence
Creative Commons - Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0


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© 2007 - 2025 Social Science Open Access Repository (SSOAR).
Based on DSpace, Copyright (c) 2002-2022, DuraSpace. All rights reserved.