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Why Great Powers Launch Destructive Cyber Operations and What to Do About It
[Stellungnahme]
Körperschaftlicher Herausgeber
Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V.
Abstract 2010 was a seminal year. Stuxnet, an American-Israeli cyber operation sabotaged Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges. It became publicly known as the first cyber operation in history that destroyed physical objects. This operation had the clear goal of degrading Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilit... mehr
2010 was a seminal year. Stuxnet, an American-Israeli cyber operation sabotaged Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges. It became publicly known as the first cyber operation in history that destroyed physical objects. This operation had the clear goal of degrading Iran’s uranium enrichment capability, but in general there has been little research as to why hegemons launch destructive cyber operations. This brief argues that the main motivations are threefold: territorial conquest, threat prevention, and retaliatory actions. Key Findings: Iran, North Korea, South Korea, Ukraine and Taiwan have been the main targets of destructive great power cyber operations. For the US, future targets will possibly be limited to countries that aim to acquire nuclear weapons - Iran and North Korea. Given ongoing border disputes, China and Russia will likely target neighboring countries with such destructive campaigns - for China those are Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan, and for Russia they are Georgia, Moldova, and Japan. To prevent destructive cyber operations, Germany and other EU states have been engaged in cyber capacity building and threat-intelligence sharing across continents. But Berlin needs to set priorities. When it comes to combatting state-sponsored cyber campaigns, Germany should deepen ties with non-EU countries that have been or likely will be targets of damaging rather than merely disruptive operations, i.e., in Southeast Asia, East Asia, the Caucasus, and Southeast Europe.... weniger
Thesaurusschlagwörter
Großmacht; Informationstechnologie; Bedrohung; Gebietsgewinn; Vergeltung; USA; Israel; Iran; Nordkorea; Südkorea; Ukraine; Taiwan; China; Vietnam; Philippinen; Japan; Russland; Georgien; Republik Moldau; Bundesrepublik Deutschland; EU; Verteidigungspolitik; Sicherheitspolitik; internationale Beziehungen; Internet
Klassifikation
Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Sicherheitspolitik
interaktive, elektronische Medien
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2023
Erscheinungsort
Berlin
Seitenangabe
7 S.
Schriftenreihe
DGAP Policy Brief, 33
ISSN
2198-5936
Status
Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet
Lizenz
Creative Commons - Namensnennung, Nicht kommerz., Keine Bearbeitung 4.0