Germany's Post-Reunification Effort to Achieve National Reconciliation: Muddling Through, Routinization, and Policy Failure

Abstract

This article reexamines the track record of German unification after three decades. The focus is placed on economic issues, while cultural, social, and geopolitical dimensions are dealt with more briefly. Following the introduction, Section II briefly examines the history of Germany’s national division and the East German political events in late 1989 and early 1990 that produced the unification of the two Germanies on 3 October 1990. Sections III to V subsequently discuss the major political and economic events during the Kohl, Schröder, and Merkel Chancellorships, respectively. Section III focuses on the high political and social costs of the initial economic disruption in the East due to the near single-minded focus on the rapid privatization of the former GDR enterprises. In Section IV, the negative feedback of the economic shock is discussed, namely high unemployment, the fiscal crisis of the welfare state, and the demographic collapse in the East. Section V sketches how the Great Recession of 2007-2008, the subsequent Euro currency, and the southern EU states’ debt crises collectively crowded out the topic of intra-German reconciliation. The emerging overall picture advanced in Section VI is that a combination of muddling through, routinization (here also termed as “reconciliation by accident”), and policy failure most adequately describes the outcome of Germany’s unification experience. Finally, Section VII puts forward some policy suggestions for Korean audiences deriving from the German case. It is argued that the geopolitical situation of the two Koreas is fundamentally different. Thus, South Korea’s main focus must be placed on patient inter-Korean engagement, focusing on conflict prevention while also engaging with all relevant external stakeholders.