dc.contributor.author | Huck, Steffen | de |
dc.contributor.author | Szech, Nora | de |
dc.contributor.author | Wenner, Lukas M. | de |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-02-25T14:00:04Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-02-25T14:00:04Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | de |
dc.identifier.uri | http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/46263 | |
dc.description.abstract | In a tedious real effort task, subjects know that their piece rate is either low or ten times higher. When subjects are informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this instrumental information when given the choice - and perform stunningly well. Agents who are uninformed regarding their piece rate tend to outperform all others, even those who know that their piece rate is high. This also holds for enforced instead of self-selected information avoidance. All our findings can be captured by a model of optimally distorted expectations following Brunnermeier and Parker (2005). (author's abstract) | en |
dc.language | en | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Wirtschaft | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Sociology & anthropology | en |
dc.subject.ddc | Economics | en |
dc.subject.ddc | Soziologie, Anthropologie | de |
dc.title | More effort with less pay: on information avoidance, belief design and performance | de |
dc.description.review | begutachtet | de |
dc.description.review | reviewed | en |
dc.source.volume | SP II 2015-304r | de |
dc.publisher.country | DEU | |
dc.publisher.city | Berlin | de |
dc.source.series | Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels | |
dc.subject.classoz | Industrie- und Betriebssoziologie, Arbeitssoziologie, industrielle Beziehungen | de |
dc.subject.classoz | Human Resources Management | en |
dc.subject.classoz | Personalwesen | de |
dc.subject.classoz | Sociology of Work, Industrial Sociology, Industrial Relations | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Erwartung | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | expectation | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Leistungsanreiz | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | incentive | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Leistungsverhalten | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | performance behavior | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Arbeitsplatz | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | job | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Information | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | information | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Lohn | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | wage | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Lohnhöhe | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | wage level | en |
dc.rights.licence | Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung | de |
dc.rights.licence | Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications | en |
ssoar.contributor.institution | WZB | de |
internal.status | formal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossen | de |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10038480 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10050933 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10051003 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10036501 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10036968 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10035631 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10051374 | |
dc.type.stock | monograph | de |
dc.type.document | Arbeitspapier | de |
dc.type.document | working paper | en |
dc.source.pageinfo | 24 | de |
internal.identifier.classoz | 1090402 | |
internal.identifier.classoz | 10204 | |
internal.identifier.document | 3 | |
dc.contributor.corporateeditor | Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH | |
internal.identifier.corporateeditor | 381 | |
internal.identifier.ddc | 330 | |
internal.identifier.ddc | 301 | |
dc.description.pubstatus | Veröffentlichungsversion | de |
dc.description.pubstatus | Published Version | en |
internal.identifier.licence | 3 | |
internal.identifier.pubstatus | 1 | |
internal.identifier.review | 2 | |
internal.identifier.series | 920 | |
dc.subject.classhort | 10200 | de |
dc.subject.classhort | 10900 | de |
dc.identifier.handle | https://hdl.handle.net/10419/121172 | |
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizer | CERTAIN | |