dc.contributor.author | Nesterov, Alexander S. | de |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-02-16T11:50:41Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-02-16T11:50:41Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | de |
dc.identifier.uri | http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/46146 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof mechanisms the following efficiency and fairness criteria are mutually incompatible: (1) Ex-post efficiency and envy-freeness, (2) ordinal efficiency and weak envy-freeness and (3) ordinal efficiency and equal division lower bound. Result (1) is the first impossibility result for this setting that uses ex-post efficiency; results (2) and (3) are more relevant for practical implementation than similar results in the literature. In addition, for N = 3 the paper strengthens the characterization result by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001): the random serial dictatorship mechanism is the unique strategy-proof, ex-post efficient mechanism that eliminates strict envy between agents with the same preferences. (author's abstract) | en |
dc.language | en | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Psychologie | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Psychology | en |
dc.title | Fairness and efficiency in a random assignment: three impossibility results | de |
dc.description.review | begutachtet | de |
dc.description.review | reviewed | en |
dc.source.volume | SP II 2014-211 | de |
dc.publisher.country | DEU | |
dc.publisher.city | Berlin | de |
dc.source.series | Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten | |
dc.subject.classoz | Sozialpsychologie | de |
dc.subject.classoz | Social Psychology | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Neid | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | envy | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Verhalten | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | behavior | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Zufallsauswahl | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | random sample | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Strategie | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | strategy | en |
dc.rights.licence | Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung | de |
dc.rights.licence | Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications | en |
ssoar.contributor.institution | WZB | de |
internal.status | formal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossen | de |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10058136 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10034530 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10063008 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10034457 | |
dc.type.stock | monograph | de |
dc.type.document | Arbeitspapier | de |
dc.type.document | working paper | en |
dc.source.pageinfo | 26 | de |
internal.identifier.classoz | 10706 | |
internal.identifier.document | 3 | |
dc.contributor.corporateeditor | Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH | |
internal.identifier.corporateeditor | 381 | |
internal.identifier.ddc | 150 | |
dc.description.pubstatus | Veröffentlichungsversion | de |
dc.description.pubstatus | Published Version | en |
internal.identifier.licence | 3 | |
internal.identifier.pubstatus | 1 | |
internal.identifier.review | 2 | |
internal.identifier.series | 961 | |
dc.identifier.handle | https://hdl.handle.net/10419/105061 | |
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizer | CERTAIN | |