Download full text
(external source)
Citation Suggestion
Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/105061
Exports for your reference manager
Fairness and efficiency in a random assignment: three impossibility results
[working paper]
Corporate Editor
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof mechanism... view more
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof mechanisms the following efficiency and fairness criteria are mutually incompatible: (1) Ex-post efficiency and envy-freeness, (2) ordinal efficiency and weak envy-freeness and (3) ordinal efficiency and equal division lower bound. Result (1) is the first impossibility result for this setting that uses ex-post efficiency; results (2) and (3) are more relevant for practical implementation than similar results in the literature. In addition, for N = 3 the paper strengthens the characterization result by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001): the random serial dictatorship mechanism is the unique strategy-proof, ex-post efficient mechanism that eliminates strict envy between agents with the same preferences. (author's abstract)... view less
Keywords
envy; behavior; random sample; strategy
Classification
Social Psychology
Document language
English
Publication Year
2014
City
Berlin
Page/Pages
26 p.
Series
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2014-211
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/105061
Status
Published Version; reviewed
Licence
Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications