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Alliances in the shadow of conflict
[working paper]
Corporate Editor
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in the... view more
Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fight against a common enemy. First, we find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fight and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the holdup problem. (author's abstract)... view less
Keywords
political conflict; competition; alliance policy; war; distribution conflict
Classification
Peace and Conflict Research, International Conflicts, Security Policy
Document language
English
Publication Year
2012
City
Berlin
Page/Pages
39 p.
Series
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Forschungsprofessur und Projekt The Future of Fiscal Federalism, SP II 2012-104
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/58350
Status
Published Version; reviewed
Licence
Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications