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%T Alliances in the shadow of conflict %A Ke, Changxia %A Konrad, Kai A. %A Morath, Florian %P 39 %V SP II 2012-104 %D 2012 %~ WZB %X Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fight against a common enemy. First, we find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fight and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the holdup problem. (author's abstract) %C DEU %C Berlin %G en %9 Arbeitspapier %W GESIS - http://www.gesis.org %~ SSOAR - http://www.ssoar.info