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[journal article]

dc.contributor.authorRasch, Alexanderde
dc.contributor.authorWambach, Achimde
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-04T03:50:00Zde
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-29T23:10:23Z
dc.date.available2012-08-29T23:10:23Z
dc.date.issued2009de
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/31342
dc.description.abstractWe study the impact of internal decision-making structures on the stability of collusive agreements. To this end, we use a three-firm spatial competition model where two firms belong to the same holding company. The holding company can decide to set prices itself or to delegate this decision to its local units. It is shown that when transportation costs are high, collusion is more stable under delegation. Furthermore, collusion with maximum prices is more profitable if price setting is delegated to the local units. Profitability is reversed for low discount factors.en
dc.languageende
dc.subject.ddcWirtschaftde
dc.subject.ddcEconomicsen
dc.subject.otherD43; L13; L41; Collusion; Holding company; Merger; Nash bargaining solution
dc.titleInternal decision-making rules and collusionen
dc.description.reviewbegutachtet (peer reviewed)de
dc.description.reviewpeer revieweden
dc.source.journalJournal of Economic Behavior & Organizationde
dc.source.volume72de
dc.publisher.countryNLD
dc.source.issue2de
dc.subject.classozBetriebswirtschaftslehrede
dc.subject.classozBusiness Administrationen
dc.subject.thesozDelegationde
dc.subject.thesozdelegation of tasksen
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-313424de
dc.date.modified2012-08-07T14:23:00Zde
dc.rights.licencePEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)de
dc.rights.licencePEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)en
ssoar.gesis.collectionSOLIS;ADISde
ssoar.contributor.institutionhttp://www.peerproject.eu/de
internal.status3de
internal.identifier.thesoz10040637
dc.type.stockarticlede
dc.type.documentjournal articleen
dc.type.documentZeitschriftenartikelde
dc.rights.copyrightfde
dc.source.pageinfo703–715
internal.identifier.classoz1090400
internal.identifier.journal196de
internal.identifier.document32
internal.identifier.ddc330
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.07.008de
dc.description.pubstatusPostprinten
dc.description.pubstatusPostprintde
internal.identifier.licence7
internal.identifier.pubstatus2
internal.identifier.review1
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizerCERTAIN
internal.check.languageharmonizerCERTAIN_RETAINED


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