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Internal decision-making rules and collusion
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract We study the impact of internal decision-making structures on the stability of collusive agreements. To this end, we use a three-firm spatial competition model where two firms belong to the same holding company. The holding company can decide to set prices itself or to delegate this decision to its ... mehr
We study the impact of internal decision-making structures on the stability of collusive agreements. To this end, we use a three-firm spatial competition model where two firms belong to the same holding company. The holding company can decide to set prices itself or to delegate this decision to its local units. It is shown that when transportation costs are high, collusion is more stable under delegation. Furthermore, collusion with maximum prices is more profitable if price setting is delegated to the local units. Profitability is reversed for low discount factors.... weniger
Thesaurusschlagwörter
Delegation
Klassifikation
Betriebswirtschaftslehre
Freie Schlagwörter
D43; L13; L41; Collusion; Holding company; Merger; Nash bargaining solution
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2009
Seitenangabe
703–715 S.
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 72 (2009) 2
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.07.008
Status
Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)