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@article{ Heijden2008, title = {Hierarchy, opportunism in teams}, author = {Heijden, Eline van der and Potters, Jan and Sefton, Martin}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, number = {1}, pages = {39-50}, volume = {69}, year = {2008}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.09.007}, urn = {https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-281136}, abstract = {We use an experiment to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production. Under revenue-sharing, each team member receives an equal share of team output; under leader-determined shares, a team leader has the power to implement her own allocation. Both arrangements are vulnerable to opportunistic incentives: under revenue-sharing team members have an incentive to free ride, while under leader-determined shares leaders have an incentive to seize team output. We find that most leaders forego the temptation to appropriate team output and manage to curtail free riding. As a result, compared to revenue-sharing, the presence of a team leader results in a significant improvement in team performance.}, keywords = {Experiment; experiment}}