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Hierarchy, opportunism in teams
[journal article]
Abstract We use an experiment to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production. Under revenue-sharing, each team member receives an equal share of team output; under leader-determined shares, a team leader has the power to implement her own allocation. Both arrangements are vulnerab... view more
We use an experiment to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production. Under revenue-sharing, each team member receives an equal share of team output; under leader-determined shares, a team leader has the power to implement her own allocation. Both arrangements are vulnerable to opportunistic incentives: under revenue-sharing team members have an incentive to free ride, while under leader-determined shares leaders have an incentive to seize team output. We find that most leaders forego the temptation to appropriate team output and manage to curtail free riding. As a result, compared to revenue-sharing, the presence of a team leader results in a significant improvement in team performance.... view less
Keywords
experiment
Classification
Social Psychology
Management Science
Free Keywords
leadership; team production; C9; D2; L2
Document language
English
Publication Year
2008
Page/Pages
p. 39-50
Journal
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 69 (2008) 1
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.09.007
Status
Postprint; peer reviewed
Licence
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)