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Social Categories and Group Preference Disputes: The Aversion to Winner-Take-All Solutions
[journal article]
Abstract Six studies explored the hypothesis that third parties are averse to resolving preference disputes with winner-take-all solutions when disputing factions belong to different social categories (e.g. gender, nationality, firms, etc.) versus the same social category. Studies 1—3 showed that third parti... view more
Six studies explored the hypothesis that third parties are averse to resolving preference disputes with winner-take-all solutions when disputing factions belong to different social categories (e.g. gender, nationality, firms, etc.) versus the same social category. Studies 1—3 showed that third parties' aversion to winner-take-all solutions, even when they are based on the unbiased toss of a coin, is greater when the disputed preferences correlate with social category membership than when they do not. Studies 4—6 suggested that reluctance to resolve inter-category disputes in a winner-take-all manner is motivated by a desire to minimize the affective disparity—the hedonic gap—between the winning and losing sides. The implication is that winner-take-all outcomes, even those that satisfy conditions of procedural fairness, become unacceptable when disputed preferences cleave along social category lines.... view less
Free Keywords
behavioral economics; competition; decision-making; distributive justice; group disputes; social categories; social comparison;
Document language
English
Publication Year
2007
Page/Pages
p. 581-593
Journal
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 10 (2007) 4
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430207084721
Status
Postprint; peer reviewed
Licence
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)