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Samaritan versus rotten kid: another look
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract
We set up a two-stage game with sequential moves by one altruist and n selfish agents. The Samaritan's dilemma (rotten kid theorem) states that the altruist can only reach her first best when the selfish agents move after (before) the altruist. We find that in general, the altruist can reach her fir... mehr
We set up a two-stage game with sequential moves by one altruist and n selfish agents. The Samaritan's dilemma (rotten kid theorem) states that the altruist can only reach her first best when the selfish agents move after (before) the altruist. We find that in general, the altruist can reach her first best when she moves first if and only if a selfish agent's action marginally affects only his own payoff. The altruist can reach her first best when she moves last if and only if a selfish agent cannot manipulate the price of his own payoff.... weniger
Klassifikation
Volkswirtschaftslehre
Freie Schlagwörter
Altruism; Rotten kid theorem; Samaritan's dilemma
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2007
Seitenangabe
S. 91-110
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 64 (2007) 1
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.006
Status
Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)