Four Years after the Coup the EU Should Increase Support for Myanmar's Resistance

Abstract

Four years after the 2021 coup, Myanmar's citizens continue - without any significant outside help - to fight the military that has plunged the country into crisis. In the face of failed regional efforts to resolve the conflict, the EU and its member states need to rethink their strategy towards Myanmar and increase their support for those resisting the junta. The civil war in Myanmar shows no signs of abating. Despite controlling less than 50 per cent of the country, the military has announced a plan to hold sham elections later this year. Heavily invested in Myanmar's liberalisation in the ten years prior to the coup, the EU has since scaled back its support considerably. The Bloc's current strategy is driven by alignment with ASEAN's failed Five-Point Consensus, which has remained limited to calls for the cessation of violence and dialogue - demands ignored by the military thus far. The EU's reluctance to increase support for the resistance is likely also informed by its disappointment in the National League for Democracy (NLD), Myanmar's largest opposition party, that formed an elected government between 2016 and 2021, as well as other political actors who championed democracy but supported the military's scorched-earth campaign against the Rohingya minority. Yet, the current multifaceted resistance should not be equated with the previous NLD government. There are multiple options for increased support that would strengthen the prospects for democracy and thus align with the EU's own goal of a values-based foreign policy.