More effort with less pay: on information avoidance, belief design and performance

Huck, Steffen; Szech, Nora; Wenner, Lukas M.

[working paper]

dc.contributor.author	Huck, Steffen	de
dc.contributor.author	Szech, Nora	de
dc.contributor.author	Wenner, Lukas M.	de
dc.date.accessioned	2016-02-25T14:00:04Z
dc.date.available	2016-02-25T14:00:04Z
dc.date.issued	2015	de
dc.identifier.uri	http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/46263
dc.description.abstract	In a tedious real effort task, subjects know that their piece rate is either low or ten times higher. When subjects are informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this instrumental information when given the choice - and perform stunningly well. Agents who are uninformed regarding their piece rate tend to outperform all others, even those who know that their piece rate is high. This also holds for enforced instead of self-selected information avoidance. All our findings can be captured by a model of optimally distorted expectations following Brunnermeier and Parker (2005). (author's abstract)	en
dc.language	en	de
dc.subject.ddc	Wirtschaft	de
dc.subject.ddc	Sociology & anthropology	en
dc.subject.ddc	Economics	en
dc.subject.ddc	Soziologie, Anthropologie	de
dc.title	More effort with less pay: on information avoidance, belief design and performance	de
dc.description.review	begutachtet	de
dc.description.review	reviewed	en
dc.source.volume	SP II 2015-304r	de
dc.publisher.country	DEU
dc.publisher.city	Berlin	de
dc.source.series	Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels
dc.subject.classoz	Industrie- und Betriebssoziologie, Arbeitssoziologie, industrielle Beziehungen	de
dc.subject.classoz	Human Resources Management	en
dc.subject.classoz	Personalwesen	de
dc.subject.classoz	Sociology of Work, Industrial Sociology, Industrial Relations	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Erwartung	de
dc.subject.thesoz	expectation	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Leistungsanreiz	de
dc.subject.thesoz	incentive	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Leistungsverhalten	de
dc.subject.thesoz	performance behavior	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Arbeitsplatz	de
dc.subject.thesoz	job	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Information	de
dc.subject.thesoz	information	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Lohn	de
dc.subject.thesoz	wage	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Lohnhöhe	de
dc.subject.thesoz	wage level	en
dc.rights.licence	Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung	de
dc.rights.licence	Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications	en
ssoar.contributor.institution	WZB	de
internal.status	formal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossen	de
internal.identifier.thesoz	10038480
internal.identifier.thesoz	10050933
internal.identifier.thesoz	10051003
internal.identifier.thesoz	10036501
internal.identifier.thesoz	10036968
internal.identifier.thesoz	10035631
internal.identifier.thesoz	10051374
dc.type.stock	monograph	de
dc.type.document	Arbeitspapier	de
dc.type.document	working paper	en
dc.source.pageinfo	24	de
internal.identifier.classoz	1090402
internal.identifier.classoz	10204
internal.identifier.document	3
dc.contributor.corporateeditor	Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
internal.identifier.corporateeditor	381
internal.identifier.ddc	330
internal.identifier.ddc	301
dc.description.pubstatus	Veröffentlichungsversion	de
dc.description.pubstatus	Published Version	en
internal.identifier.licence	3
internal.identifier.pubstatus	1
internal.identifier.review	2
internal.identifier.series	920
dc.subject.classhort	10200	de
dc.subject.classhort	10900	de
dc.identifier.handle	https://hdl.handle.net/10419/121172
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizer	CERTAIN

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Industrie- und Betriebssoziologie, Arbeitssoziologie, industrielle Beziehungen
Sociology of Work, Industrial Sociology, Industrial Relations
Personalwesen
Human Resources Management

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