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Social Categories and Group Preference Disputes: The Aversion to Winner-Take-All Solutions


Garcia, Stephen M.; Miller, Dale T.


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Abstract Six studies explored the hypothesis that third parties are averse to resolving preference disputes with winner-take-all solutions when disputing factions belong to different social categories (e.g. gender, nationality, firms, etc.) versus the same social category. Studies 1—3 showed that third parties' aversion to winner-take-all solutions, even when they are based on the unbiased toss of a coin, is greater when the disputed preferences correlate with social category membership than when they do not. Studies 4—6 suggested that reluctance to resolve inter-category disputes in a winner-take-all manner is motivated by a desire to minimize the affective disparity—the hedonic gap—between the winning and losing sides. The implication is that winner-take-all outcomes, even those that satisfy conditions of procedural fairness, become unacceptable when disputed preferences cleave along social category lines.
Freie Schlagwörter behavioral economics; competition; decision-making; distributive justice; group disputes; social categories; social comparison;
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2007
Seitenangabe S. 581-593
Zeitschriftentitel Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 10 (2007) 4
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1368430207084721
Status Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)