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%T Social Categories and Group Preference Disputes: The Aversion to Winner-Take-All Solutions %A Garcia, Stephen M. %A Miller, Dale T. %J Group Processes & Intergroup Relations %N 4 %P 581-593 %V 10 %D 2007 %K behavioral economics; competition; decision-making; distributive justice; group disputes; social categories; social comparison; %= 2011-03-01T05:55:00Z %~ http://www.peerproject.eu/ %> https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-228460 %X Six studies explored the hypothesis that third parties are averse to resolving preference disputes with winner-take-all solutions when disputing factions belong to different social categories (e.g. gender, nationality, firms, etc.) versus the same social category. Studies 1—3 showed that third parties' aversion to winner-take-all solutions, even when they are based on the unbiased toss of a coin, is greater when the disputed preferences correlate with social category membership than when they do not. Studies 4—6 suggested that reluctance to resolve inter-category disputes in a winner-take-all manner is motivated by a desire to minimize the affective disparity—the hedonic gap—between the winning and losing sides. The implication is that winner-take-all outcomes, even those that satisfy conditions of procedural fairness, become unacceptable when disputed preferences cleave along social category lines. %G en %9 journal article %W GESIS - http://www.gesis.org %~ SSOAR - http://www.ssoar.info