Private investment in Chinese football clubs: political capital and state-business exchanges

Abstract

Business-government relations play a crucial role in China's economic development and policy implementation. Situated in an asymmetric dependency nexus, local officials court business investments to facilitate policy and boost their political careers, while under Xi Jinping private firms are increasingly incentivised to support party-state goals to gain access to political capital. In this study, we use the case of football development to show how private business actors and government officials enter reciprocal relationships based on the exchange of respective financial and political capital. Using insights from semistructured interviews with practitioners and macro-level data, such as investors' characteristics and financial data, we explore the role of political capital in state-business exchanges, specifying the mechanisms of this interaction (motivations, forms, and perceived benefits) and three distinct investment scenarios in the case of football. Besides insights into the sector, the article contributes to the understanding of the modus operandi of private business and local government in the Chinese political economy at large.