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Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):
https://doi.org/10.37043/JURA.2017.9.2.6
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Cooperative game theory approach to establishing a landscape agreement
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract
As the need for a participatory approach towards a sustainable landscape development grows, this paper has applied the cooperative game theory to analyse the mechanism of entering a landscape agreement which requires the participation and initiative of local residents and stakeholders. The result... mehr
As the need for a participatory approach towards a sustainable landscape development grows, this paper has applied the cooperative game theory to analyse the mechanism of entering a landscape agreement which requires the participation and initiative of local residents and stakeholders. The results confirmed that a landscape agreement only becomes possible with a certain level of supporters and the optimal situation is when all participants agree. Moreover, the possibility of free riders, which would prevent reaching a universal agreement, was also confirmed. The effect of government subsidies for landscape considerate building and the enforcement of penalties for building without were also examined. As a result, we learned that subsidies and the enforcement of penalties influences the number of supporters required for the landscape agreement and in preventing free riders.... weniger
Thesaurusschlagwörter
Strafe; Subvention; Landschaftsplanung
Klassifikation
Raumplanung und Regionalforschung
Freie Schlagwörter
landscape agreement; free rider
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2017
Seitenangabe
S. 187-196
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Urban and Regional Analysis, 9 (2017) 2
ISSN
2067-4082
Status
Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet (peer reviewed)