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https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i3.6781
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Preferences and Institutions in European (Dis)Integration
[journal article]
Abstract
In this article, we present a game-theoretical model of political (dis)integration, and the incentives voters and politicians face during integration processes. We apply the model to the European Union. Preference homogeneity and economies of scale do not suffice to explain European integration. Rat... view more
In this article, we present a game-theoretical model of political (dis)integration, and the incentives voters and politicians face during integration processes. We apply the model to the European Union. Preference homogeneity and economies of scale do not suffice to explain European integration. Rather, integration decisions are taken within an institutional setting that involves politicians with interests that may diverge from those of the voters they represent. Such politicians may take integration decisions that are not in line with their voters' interests as a result. We show that voters can in some circumstances prevent integration by strategically electing representatives who are farther away from them. The model provides novel insights into the process of European (dis)integration and the voter–politician dynamics that determine it. In addition, our model offers an alternative explanation for the relative success of extremist parties in the European Union.... view less
Keywords
political institution; European integration; EU; voting behavior
Classification
European Politics
Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture
Free Keywords
European representatives; spatial models; voters' interests
Document language
English
Publication Year
2023
Page/Pages
p. 5-15
Journal
Politics and Governance, 11 (2023) 3
Issue topic
The Causes and Modes of European Disintegration
ISSN
2183-2463
Status
Published Version; peer reviewed