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Nach der Überprüfungskonferenz: der NPT bleibt stabil
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dc.contributor.authorSchneider, Jonasde
dc.contributor.authorHorovitz, Liviude
dc.date.accessioned2023-04-12T08:30:49Z
dc.date.available2023-04-12T08:30:49Z
dc.date.issued2022de
dc.identifier.issn2747-5107de
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/86168
dc.description.abstractOriginally scheduled for 2020, the 10th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had to be deferred four times. It was not until August 2022 that the 191 NPT states finally met. At least since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, observers had expected that the delegates would be unable to agree on a Final Document. Surprisingly, differences over nuclear disarmament did not play a role in the failure of the conference, despite the growing polarization over this issue since the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) at the beginning of 2021. Russia alone was responsible for torpedoing the consensus. Conversely, all the non-nuclear NPT parties made major concessions in a bid to pre­vent the conference from failing. This shows that in a context of global tensions, nuclear disarmament is a lesser concern for the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) than they themselves have long been suggesting. That the stability of the NPT does not depend on progress towards disarmament is good news. For Germany’s National Security Strategy (NSS), it means that greater concessions to advocates of the TPNW are not necessary to protect the NPT. (Autorenreferat)de
dc.languageende
dc.subject.ddcPolitikwissenschaftde
dc.subject.ddcPolitical scienceen
dc.subject.otherGlobal; Nonproliferation nuklearer Waffen; Durchführung von Rüstungskontrollregelungen; Überprüfung der Einhaltung völkerrechtlicher Verträgede
dc.titleAfter the Review Conference: the NPT remains robustde
dc.title.alternativeNach der Überprüfungskonferenz: der NPT bleibt stabilde
dc.description.reviewbegutachtetde
dc.description.reviewrevieweden
dc.source.volume69/2022de
dc.publisher.countryDEUde
dc.publisher.cityBerlinde
dc.source.seriesSWP Comment
dc.subject.classozFriedens- und Konfliktforschung, Sicherheitspolitikde
dc.subject.classozPeace and Conflict Research, International Conflicts, Security Policyen
dc.subject.thesozRüstungskontrollede
dc.subject.thesozarms controlen
dc.subject.thesozMassenvernichtungswaffede
dc.subject.thesozweapon of mass destructionen
dc.subject.thesozProliferationde
dc.subject.thesozproliferationen
dc.subject.thesozinternationales Abkommende
dc.subject.thesozinternational agreementen
dc.subject.thesozKernwaffede
dc.subject.thesoznuclear weaponen
dc.subject.thesozAbrüstungde
dc.subject.thesozdisarmamenten
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-86168-6
dc.rights.licenceDeposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitungde
dc.rights.licenceDeposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modificationsen
ssoar.contributor.institutionSWPde
internal.statusformal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossende
internal.identifier.thesoz10049693
internal.identifier.thesoz10039582
internal.identifier.thesoz10061842
internal.identifier.thesoz10034390
internal.identifier.thesoz10036886
internal.identifier.thesoz10034419
dc.type.stockmonographde
dc.type.documentStellungnahmede
dc.type.documentcommenten
dc.source.pageinfo4de
internal.identifier.classoz10507
internal.identifier.document27
dc.contributor.corporateeditorStiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit
internal.identifier.corporateeditor292
internal.identifier.ddc320
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.18449/2022C69de
dc.description.pubstatusVeröffentlichungsversionde
dc.description.pubstatusPublished Versionen
internal.identifier.licence3
internal.identifier.pubstatus1
internal.identifier.review2
internal.identifier.series756
dc.subject.classhort10500de
internal.pdf.validfalse
internal.pdf.wellformedtrue
internal.pdf.encryptedfalse


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