dc.contributor.author | Minzarari, Dumitru | de |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-10-12T11:19:25Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-10-12T11:19:25Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2022 | de |
dc.identifier.issn | 2747-5107 | de |
dc.identifier.uri | https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/81673 | |
dc.description.abstract | Despite what looked like tremendous efforts by the West to deter Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the Kremlin started a full-scale military invasion across the Ukrainian border from the north, east, and south. Clarifying why these deterrence efforts did not work as expected could provide useful insights for building more effective strategies to stop Russia's aggression. It would also allow for adjusting future policies of deterrence against Russia. The EU and NATO should consider their misperceptions about Russia that undermined their ability to politically and militarily discourage Russia's aggression. They also should consider what actions have fuelled Russia's misperceptions about the West and emboldened the Kremlin to launch its military invasion of Ukraine. (author's abstract) | de |
dc.language | en | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Politikwissenschaft | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Political science | en |
dc.subject.other | Bilateraler internationaler Konflikt; Aggression (militärisch); Russisch-Ukrainischer Krieg; Kriegsverhütung; Abschreckungsstrategie; Fehleinschätzung/Fehlperzeption; Kriegsverlauf; Internationale Konfliktverhandlungen | de |
dc.title | Failing to deter Russia's war against Ukraine: the role of misperceptions | de |
dc.description.review | begutachtet | de |
dc.description.review | reviewed | en |
dc.source.volume | 33/2022 | de |
dc.publisher.country | DEU | de |
dc.publisher.city | Berlin | de |
dc.source.series | SWP Comment | |
dc.subject.classoz | Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Sicherheitspolitik | de |
dc.subject.classoz | Peace and Conflict Research, International Conflicts, Security Policy | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Russland | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | Russia | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Ukraine | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | Ukraine | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Krieg | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | war | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Abschreckung | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | deterrence | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | NATO | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | NATO | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | EU | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | EU | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Außenpolitik | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | foreign policy | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Konfliktregelung | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | conflict management | en |
dc.identifier.urn | urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-81673-7 | |
dc.rights.licence | Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung | de |
dc.rights.licence | Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications | en |
ssoar.contributor.institution | SWP | de |
internal.status | formal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossen | de |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10057012 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10064141 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10035033 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10034471 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10053032 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10041441 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10034694 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10049492 | |
dc.type.stock | monograph | de |
dc.type.document | Stellungnahme | de |
dc.type.document | comment | en |
dc.source.pageinfo | 8 | de |
internal.identifier.classoz | 10507 | |
internal.identifier.document | 27 | |
dc.contributor.corporateeditor | Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit | |
internal.identifier.corporateeditor | 292 | |
internal.identifier.ddc | 320 | |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.18449/2022C33 | de |
dc.description.pubstatus | Veröffentlichungsversion | de |
dc.description.pubstatus | Published Version | en |
internal.identifier.licence | 3 | |
internal.identifier.pubstatus | 1 | |
internal.identifier.review | 2 | |
internal.identifier.series | 756 | |
dc.subject.classhort | 10500 | de |
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