Value-Based Ideas or Material Interests? An Explanation of Polish Governmental Preference Formation towards Eurozone Accession

Abstract

Why did Poland not join the Eurozone despite being integrated economically and dependent on investments and trade with existing Eurozone countries? The reluctance of its government seems puzzling taking into consideration Polish economic exposure to Eurozone countries as well as its commitment to switch to the euro stemming from EU treaties. The Polish governmental position on Eurozone accession demonstrates that monetary integration is not only an economic and legal issue, but it also results from political decisions of individual governments. This paper argues that a complementary understanding of the position of the Polish government on Eurozone accession is possible by looking at domestic ideas and interests. For this aim, the societal approach to governmental preference formation is employed. It focuses on the influence of domestic ideas (value-based collective expectations of voters) and interests (cost-benefit calculations of lobby groups) on governmental positions. In applying the societal approach, this paper has two goals: first, to show that the Polish governments’ reluctance to join the Eurozone stems from domestic societal pressures (value-based ideas and material interests) and, second, to specify the conditions for either ideas’ or interests’ individual bearing on the government’s preference.