A constituição de sentido como acontecimento: Heidegger e a transformação da fenomenologia

Abstract

The concept of event is one of the key themes in Heidegger's thought and offers a guideline to understand his work. This paper shows how the genesis of this concept is directly related to the transformation of phenomenology undertaken by Heidegger during his first lectures in Freiburg (1919-1923) and provides some insights into the importance of this topic to the development of fundamental ontology in Being and time. Our analysis is divided into three parts. First, we address the relation between intentionality and world. The nexus of the world is the space of primordial constitution of intentional experience. This relation points to Heidegger's critique of the abstraction of formal ontology and to the structure of event as the way in which the experience of the concrete and historical self is given. Next, we analyze Heidegger's concept of phenomenon to distinguish his philosophy from Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. The central element of this difference lies in the introduction of the dimension of event and situation in the phenomenon, which is not present in the Husserlian model of intentionality. Finally, we present an interpretation of the relation between factical life, event and situation, to point out some consequences of the introduction of the problem of history in phenomenology.