dc.contributor.author | Llorente-Saguer, Aniol | de |
dc.contributor.author | Sheremeta, Roman M. | de |
dc.contributor.author | Szech, Nora | de |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-11-27T08:07:26Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-11-27T08:07:26Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | de |
dc.identifier.uri | https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/65591 | |
dc.description.abstract | A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases performance of contestants because of the "discouragement effect." Leveling the playing field by favoring weaker contestants through bid-caps and favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce the discouragement effect and increase the designer's revenue. We test these predictions in an experiment. Our data show that indeed, strengthening weaker contestants through tie-breaks and bid-caps significantly diminishes the discouragement effect. Bid-caps can also improve revenue. Most deviations from Nash equilibrium can be explained by the level-k model of reasoning. | de |
dc.language | en | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Psychologie | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Psychology | en |
dc.subject.other | all-pay auction; bid-caps; contest design; rent-seeking; tie-breaks | de |
dc.title | Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants: an experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions | de |
dc.description.review | begutachtet | de |
dc.description.review | reviewed | en |
dc.source.volume | SP II 2016-307 | de |
dc.publisher.country | DEU | |
dc.publisher.city | Berlin | de |
dc.source.series | Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels | |
dc.subject.classoz | Sozialpsychologie | de |
dc.subject.classoz | Social Psychology | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Auktion | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | auction | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Teilnehmer | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | participant | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Wettkampf | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | match | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Motivation | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | motivation | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Verhalten | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | behavior | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Spieltheorie | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | game theory | en |
dc.rights.licence | Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung | de |
dc.rights.licence | Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications | en |
ssoar.contributor.institution | WZB | de |
internal.status | formal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossen | de |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10068068 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10060100 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10062295 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10036462 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10034530 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10058607 | |
dc.type.stock | monograph | de |
dc.type.document | Arbeitspapier | de |
dc.type.document | working paper | en |
dc.source.pageinfo | 32 | de |
internal.identifier.classoz | 10706 | |
internal.identifier.document | 3 | |
dc.contributor.corporateeditor | Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH | |
internal.identifier.corporateeditor | 381 | |
internal.identifier.ddc | 150 | |
dc.description.pubstatus | Veröffentlichungsversion | de |
dc.description.pubstatus | Published Version | en |
internal.identifier.licence | 3 | |
internal.identifier.pubstatus | 1 | |
internal.identifier.review | 2 | |
internal.identifier.series | 920 | |
internal.dda.reference | https://www.econstor.eu/oai/request@@oai:econstor.eu:10419/141440 | |
dc.identifier.handle | https://hdl.handle.net/10419/141440 | |
ssoar.urn.registration | false | de |