Deterring to Lead? Nuclear Crises, Non-State Proxies, and India's Regional Leadership

Abstract

Why is India unable to maintain regional leadership in a nuclearized South Asia? In this paper, we explore the impediments to India's regional leadership by examining Delhi's foreign policy behavior within the nuclearized rivalry with Pakistan since 1998. Based on a comparison of Indian foreign policy elites' responses to a set of dyadic crises since overt nuclearisation in 1998, we argue that structural parameters of South Asia's current security environment undermine the prospects of coercing or influencing the behavior of India's most potent contender. More specifically, we argue that Delhi's failure to develop an effective strategy to deter armed resistance is largely due to the combined presence of militant groups and inadequate deterrence strategies. Recurrent, undeterred militant attacks have thus become a symbol of resistance against India's predominance in the region.