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[journal article]

dc.contributor.authorHaaß, Felixde
dc.contributor.authorOttmann, Martinde
dc.date.accessioned2018-02-26T10:56:15Z
dc.date.available2018-02-26T10:56:15Z
dc.date.issued2017de
dc.identifier.issn0305-750Xde
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/56075
dc.description.abstractDoes power-sharing drive corruption in post-conflict countries? We conceptualize government elites in any post-conflict situation as rent-seeking agents who need to ensure the support of their key constituencies to remain in power. Power-sharing institutions - especially cabinet-level, executive power-sharing institutions - systematically shape these rent-seeking motives. Power-sharing cabinets create political coalitions dominated by small circles of government and rebel elites with direct access to state resources and low levels of loyalty toward the government leader. Also, the provisional nature of many power-sharing institutions increases rent-seeking incentives: facing a limited time horizon in office, rent-seeking elites within the power-sharing coalition are likely to capture as many rents as possible before they have to leave office. Thus, post-conflict countries with power-sharing institutions should exhibit higher aggregated levels of rent-seeking measured as the level of corruption in a country. In a statistical analysis of all post-conflict situations during 1996–2010, we find that power-sharing cabinets substantively increase corruption in post-conflict countries and that this effect is stronger in the presence of natural resource rents. These findings add quantitative evidence to the debate about drivers of post-conflict corruption. Moreover, they highlight a trade-off between short-term stability and long-term negative effects of corruption for post-conflict political and economic development.en
dc.languageende
dc.subject.ddcPolitikwissenschaftde
dc.subject.ddcPolitical scienceen
dc.subject.otherRegierungssystem; Nachkonfliktphase; Machtteilung; Verteilte Macht; Machtstruktur; Rent-Seeking; Konfliktpartei; Konfliktbeteiligtede
dc.titleProfits from Peace: the Political Economy of Power-Sharing and Corruptionde
dc.description.reviewbegutachtet (peer reviewed)de
dc.description.reviewpeer revieweden
dc.source.journalWorld Development: the Multi-Disciplinary International Journal Devoted to the Study and Promotion of World Development
dc.source.volume99de
dc.publisher.countryNLD
dc.subject.classozPolitical Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Cultureen
dc.subject.classozpolitische Willensbildung, politische Soziologie, politische Kulturde
dc.subject.thesozinstitutional factorsen
dc.subject.thesozKriminalitätde
dc.subject.thesozinstitutionelle Faktorende
dc.subject.thesozpolitische Elitede
dc.subject.thesozpoweren
dc.subject.thesoztype of governmenten
dc.subject.thesozRegierungde
dc.subject.thesozcriminalityen
dc.subject.thesozpost-war perioden
dc.subject.thesozMachtsicherungde
dc.subject.thesozKorruptionde
dc.subject.thesozStrukturde
dc.subject.thesozpolitical eliteen
dc.subject.thesozpolitische Stabilitätde
dc.subject.thesozsecuring of poweren
dc.subject.thesozeconomic development (on national level)en
dc.subject.thesozMachtde
dc.subject.thesozWirtschaftsentwicklungde
dc.subject.thesozstructureen
dc.subject.thesozpolitische Ökonomiede
dc.subject.thesozgovernmenten
dc.subject.thesozpolitical stabilityen
dc.subject.thesozpolitical economyen
dc.subject.thesozconflict managementen
dc.subject.thesozKonfliktregelungde
dc.subject.thesozNachkriegszeitde
dc.subject.thesozcorruptionen
dc.subject.thesozStaatsformde
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-56075-8
dc.rights.licenceCreative Commons - Attribution 4.0en
dc.rights.licenceCreative Commons - Namensnennung 4.0de
ssoar.contributor.institutionGIGAde
internal.statusnoch nicht fertig erschlossende
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dc.type.stockarticlede
dc.type.documentjournal articleen
dc.type.documentZeitschriftenartikelde
dc.source.pageinfo60-74de
internal.identifier.classoz10504
internal.identifier.journal1271
internal.identifier.document32
internal.identifier.ddc320
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.07.006de
dc.description.pubstatusPublished Versionen
dc.description.pubstatusVeröffentlichungsversionde
internal.identifier.licence16
internal.identifier.pubstatus1
internal.identifier.review1
dc.description.miscWGLde
dc.subject.classhort10500de
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internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizerCERTAIN
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