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@article{ Epkenhans2004,
 title = {Schlachtflottenbau und Werftindustrie (1897-1914)},
 author = {Epkenhans, Michael},
 journal = {Deutsches Schiffahrtsarchiv},
 pages = {183-200},
 volume = {27},
 year = {2004},
 issn = {0343-3668},
 urn = {https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-55878-6},
 abstract = {From 1897 to 1898, the German Reich under Kaiser Wilhelm II, Bülow and Tirpitz changed the course of its policy with regard to arms and foreign relations. The objective was “equality” with Great Britain, the leading naval and world power, and to achieve it the construction of a powerful battle fleet seemed necessary. However, in order to realize Admiral Tirpitz’s plan, the navy was obliged to depend on the "co-operation" of German shipyards. The latter complied willingly, hoping that - after years of crisis - the naval contracts would keep their facilities at full capacity and bring in high profits. The Reich Naval Office was also optimistic that state contracts would turn the shipyards into a new and leading sector of German industry and, by compensating for economic fluctuations, would have a stabilizing effect on the country's domestic policy. After in-depth consideration, the Reich Naval Office decided that it still wanted to retain its autonomy with regard to the placement of contracts for warships - if necessary it also awarded contracts to the generally more expensive state shipyards, in order to combat overly high prices. At first the hopes for a great future in German shipbuilding seemed justified: The shipyards authorized to build warships - Blohm & Voss, Vulcan, Germaniawerft, AG "Weser," Howaldtswerke and Schichau - invested considerable sums in the expansion and modernization of their facilities. Only a few years later, however, reality caught up with them. Steep economic downturns rapidly threatened the existence of several shipyards which could no longer keep their expensive facilities running at full capacity. The profits, satisfactory at first, gradually began to dwindle, and eventually the yards made a loss on most of their business. One contributing factor was the circumstance that the German shipyards - against their hopes - were unable to increase their international market share, either in trade or in warship construction. For the Reich Naval Office this development was positive on the one hand, because it meant that prices, and thus the costs of building a fleet, could be kept low; on the other hand it eyed the crisis in the shipbuilding industry with concern, because the collapse of a major shipyard could bring considerable political problems in its wake. There was also the worry that a shipbuilding cartel might form, and possibly drive the price of warship construction to horrendous heights. In sum, the hopes placed in fleet construction as a means of rescuing the German shipbuilding industry turned out to be illusory.},
 keywords = {Schiffbau; shipbuilding; Wirtschaftsgeschichte; economic history; Deutschland; Germany; Deutsches Kaiserreich; German Empire}}