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dc.contributor.authorDaniels, Laura von
dc.date.accessioned2017-09-18T12:33:28Z
dc.date.available2017-09-18T12:33:28Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.issn1861-1761
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/53569
dc.description.abstractFollowing the global financial crisis, in 2009 the world’s major economies (G20) quickly agreed on stricter rules for financial markets. Heads of government tasked the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) with developing a new framework for the capitalisation and liquidity of globally active financial institutions and the agreement (Basel III) was signed in December 2010. A crucial area that was left to be finalized later were final rules on the use of banks’ internal risk models. While it has been the US government’s intention to restrict risk models the EU made it clear that it would not agree to additional rules leading to increased regulatory capital requirements. After a long stalemate in the negotiations, chances now seem to increase for an agreement in fall 2017 between European and US representatives in the Basel Committee. The Trump administration might be willing to meet the EU halfway and grant Europe’s ailing banks greater freedom in calculating risk. But the price could be high: the US wants more leeway in national interpretations of the Basel framework. The European Commission, which will have to give its agreement in Basel, needs to be aware of the risks this poses to the stability of its own banking market. (author's abstract)en
dc.languageen
dc.subject.ddcWirtschaftde
dc.subject.ddcEconomicsen
dc.subject.otherGeld- und Kapitalmarkt; Bankenkontrolle; Basel III
dc.titleLast exit Basel III: as regulation of bank capital comes to a close, stability concerns risk taking a backseat
dc.description.reviewbegutachtetde
dc.description.reviewrevieweden
dc.source.volume22/2017
dc.publisher.countryDEU
dc.publisher.cityBerlin
dc.source.seriesSWP Commentde
dc.subject.classozWirtschaftspolitikde
dc.subject.classozEconomic Policyen
dc.subject.classozVolkswirtschaftstheoriede
dc.subject.classozNational Economyen
dc.subject.thesozUSAde
dc.subject.thesozUnited States of Americaen
dc.subject.thesozEUde
dc.subject.thesozEUen
dc.subject.thesozFinanzkrisede
dc.subject.thesozfinancial crisisen
dc.subject.thesozFinanzmarktde
dc.subject.thesozfinancial marketen
dc.subject.thesozRegulierungde
dc.subject.thesozregulationen
dc.subject.thesozBankenaufsichtde
dc.subject.thesozbanking supervisionen
dc.subject.thesozLiquiditätde
dc.subject.thesozliquidityen
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-53569-9
dc.rights.licenceDeposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitungde
dc.rights.licenceDeposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modificationsen
ssoar.contributor.institutionSWP
internal.statusformal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossen
internal.identifier.thesoz10041244
internal.identifier.thesoz10041441
internal.identifier.thesoz10062414
internal.identifier.thesoz10034971
internal.identifier.thesoz10039952
internal.identifier.thesoz10037636
internal.identifier.thesoz10039712
dc.type.stockmonograph
dc.type.documentStellungnahmede
dc.type.documentcommenten
dc.source.pageinfo7
internal.identifier.classoz1090302
internal.identifier.classoz1090301
internal.identifier.document27
dc.contributor.corporateeditorStiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit
internal.identifier.corporateeditor292
internal.identifier.ddc330
dc.description.pubstatusVeröffentlichungsversionde
dc.description.pubstatusPublished Versionen
internal.identifier.licence3
internal.identifier.pubstatus1
internal.identifier.review2
internal.identifier.series756
dc.subject.classhort10500
internal.pdf.validfalse
internal.pdf.wellformedfalse
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizerCERTAIN
internal.check.languageharmonizerCERTAIN_RETAINED


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