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@book{ Konrad1992,
 title = {Equilibrium corporate ownership structure with free-riding},
 author = {Konrad, Kai A.},
 year = {1992},
 series = {Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge},
 volume = {92-22},
 address = {München},
 publisher = {Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät},
 abstract = {Management control by shareholders is a public good. In the Nash equilibrium only the largest  shareholder spends effort on management control.  This is an incentive not to be the largest  shareholder, and this incentive determines some  properties of equilibrium corporate ownership  structure. In particular, a perfect market with
endogenous shareholdings and Nash behavior cannot overcome the underprovision problem implied by the public good problem, even if any diversification incentive for risk sharing is absent.},
 keywords = {Unternehmen; enterprise; Gleichgewicht; equilibrium; Eigentum; property; Struktur; structure; Shareholder Value; shareholder value; Management; management; Kontrolle; control; öffentliches Gut; nonmarket good; Risiko; risk; Anreizsystem; incentive system; Ökonomie; economy}}