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dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.de
dc.date.accessioned2016-11-29T08:42:38Z
dc.date.available2016-11-29T08:42:38Z
dc.date.issued1990de
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/49223
dc.description.abstractThe taxation of risk-taking revenues induces an investor, who allocates a given amount of resources between a risky and a safe asset, to increase the risky share of his portfolio. This result was first derived by Domar and Musgrave in a partial analytic framework. In a more general framework it has been shown that, given that all tax revenues are redistributed in a lump-sum fashion, this Domar-Musgrave phenomenon can be expected to show up only if a substantial diversification of risks takes place within the tax proceeds. Given perfect capital markets, however, such "insurance"-properties of risk-taking-revenue taxes cannot be expected to exist. Is the Domar-Musgrave pheonomenon only a partial analytic peculiarity without much inportance? In this paper it is tried to revaluate the Domar-Musgrave phenomenon. Asymmetric information, in particular with regard to the valuation of entre-preneural firms that are considering going public, may induce a process of adverse selection. Some entrepreneurs decide not to go public or they sell only some part of their firms. In equilibrium, therefore, some unsystematic risk remains uncon­ solidated. In this case "compulsory insurance" such as a risk-taking-revenue tax is not ineffective. An additional risk consolidation takes place within the collected tax proceeds. However, the impact of such taxes on welfare is quite diverse, depending on the abilities of the owners of taxed entrepreneural firms to react to the taxes. If owners of entrepreneural firms cannot react via a change of ownership structure, then they will react like the investor in the portfolio model of the Domar-Musgrave framework, reproducing the effects derived in this literature. Good examples of this type of firm may be small business firms and craftsmen. However, if the original owner-managers of firms go public with a strictly positive percentage of their firms, while keeping a fraction of their own firms in their portfolios, the risk-taking-revenue tax induces them to increase this fraction. In this case the tax reinforces the process of adverse selection. The impact of a risk-taking-revenue tax on welfare depends on the type of firm. (author's abstract)en
dc.languageende
dc.subject.ddcWirtschaftde
dc.subject.ddcEconomicsen
dc.titleThe Domar-Musgrave phenomenon and adverse selectionde
dc.source.volume90-08de
dc.publisher.countryDEU
dc.publisher.cityMünchende
dc.source.seriesMünchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträgede
dc.subject.classozÖffentliche Finanzen und Finanzwissenschaftde
dc.subject.classozManagement Scienceen
dc.subject.classozManagementde
dc.subject.classozPublic Financeen
dc.subject.thesozSteuerbelastungde
dc.subject.thesozincomeen
dc.subject.thesozcapitalen
dc.subject.thesozRisikode
dc.subject.thesoztax burdenen
dc.subject.thesozWohlfahrtde
dc.subject.thesozrisken
dc.subject.thesozwelfareen
dc.subject.thesozenterpriseen
dc.subject.thesoztaxationen
dc.subject.thesozEinkommende
dc.subject.thesozBesteuerungde
dc.subject.thesozrisk behavioren
dc.subject.thesozUnternehmende
dc.subject.thesozRisikoverhaltende
dc.subject.thesozKapitalde
dc.rights.licenceDeposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitungde
dc.rights.licenceDeposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modificationsen
internal.statusformal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossende
internal.identifier.thesoz10041542
internal.identifier.thesoz10038821
internal.identifier.thesoz10038089
internal.identifier.thesoz10039009
internal.identifier.thesoz10035126
internal.identifier.thesoz10036080
internal.identifier.thesoz10045555
internal.identifier.thesoz10049512
dc.type.stockmonographde
dc.type.documentArbeitspapierde
dc.type.documentworking paperen
dc.source.pageinfo28de
internal.identifier.classoz1090401
internal.identifier.classoz1090303
internal.identifier.document3
dc.contributor.corporateeditorUniversität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
internal.identifier.corporateeditor746
internal.identifier.ddc330
internal.identifier.licence3
dc.description.miscwzbReportsAndWorkingPapers-10419_112681de
internal.identifier.series1033
dc.identifier.handlehttps://hdl.handle.net/10419/112681
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizerCERTAIN


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