Endnote export

 

%T Powersharing and Democratic Survival
%A Graham, Benjamin A.T.
%A Miller, Michael K.
%A Strøm, Kaare W.
%P 43
%V 141
%D 2016
%K Powersharing
%@ 1605-8003
%> https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-47772-6
%X Democracy is often fragile, especially in states that have recently experienced civil conflict. To protect
emerging democracies, many scholars and practitioners recommend political powersharing institutions.
Yet there is little empirical research on whether powersharing promotes democratic survival, and some
concern that it can limit electoral accountability. To fill this gap, we differentiate between inclusive,
dispersive, and constraining powersharing and analyze their effects on democratic survival using a new
global dataset. We find sharp distinctions across types of powersharing and political context. Inclusive
powersharing, such as ethnic quotas, promotes democratic survival only in post-conflict settings. In
contrast, dispersive institutions such as federalism destabilize post-conflict democracies. Only
constraining powersharing consistently facilitates democratic survival in societies both with and without
recent conflict. Our results suggest that institution-builders and international organizations should
prioritize institutions that constrain leaders, including independent judiciaries, civilian control of the armed forces, and constitutional protections of individual and group rights.
%C AUT
%C Wien
%G en
%9 Forschungsbericht
%W GESIS - http://www.gesis.org
%~ SSOAR - http://www.ssoar.info