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Efficient lottery design
[working paper]
Corporate Editor
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract
There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms which proved to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used for indivisible good allocation in real-life. To help faci... view more
There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms which proved to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used for indivisible good allocation in real-life. To help facilitate the design of practical lottery mechanisms, we provide new tools for obtaining stochastic improvements in lotteries. As applications, we propose lottery mechanisms that improve upon the widely-used random serial dictatorship mechanism and a lottery representation of its competitor, the probabilistic serial mechanism. The tools we provide here can be useful in developing welfare-enhanced new lottery mechanisms for practical applications such as school choice. (author's abstract)... view less
Keywords
random sample; efficiency; market mechanism; effect; distribution; social assistance; school choice; stochastics
Classification
Basic Research, General Concepts and History of Economics
Document language
English
Publication Year
2015
City
Berlin
Page/Pages
36 p.
Series
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2015-203
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/107132
Status
Published Version; reviewed
Licence
Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications