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%T Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
%A Braun, Sebastian
%A Dwenger, Nadja
%A Kübler, Dorothea
%A Westkamp, Alexander
%P 45
%V SP II 2012-201
%D 2012
%K Gale-Shapley Mechanismus; Boston-Mechanismus; Shapley-Wert
%~ WZB
%X Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the mechanism currently employed by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions, which first allocates seats in the quota for top-grade students before allocating all other seats among remaining applicants. The second is a modified version of the student-proposing deferred acceptance (SDA) algorithm, which simultaneously allocates seats in all quotas. Our main result is that the current procedure, designed to give top-grade students an advantage, actually harms them, as students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for top-grade students and could thus be a valuable tool for redesigning university admissions in Germany. (author's abstract)
%C DEU
%C Berlin
%G en
%9 Arbeitspapier
%W GESIS - http://www.gesis.org
%~ SSOAR - http://www.ssoar.info