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[working paper]

dc.contributor.authorValasek, Justinde
dc.date.accessioned2016-10-25T09:32:49Z
dc.date.available2016-02-22T07:52:09Z
dc.date.available2016-10-25T09:32:49Z
dc.date.issued2016de
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/46218
dc.description.abstractState capacity is optimized when public institutions are staffed by individuals with public-service motivation. However, when motivated agents value the collective reputation of their place of employment, steady-state equilibria with both high and low aggregate motivation (reputation) in the mission-oriented sector exist. Reforming a low-motivation institution requires a non-monotonic wage path: since the effect of higher wages on motivation is negative for a highreputation institution, but positive for a low-reputation institution, a transition to a high-reputation steady state requires an initial wage increase to crowd motivated workers in, followed by a wage decrease to crowd non-motivated workers out.en
dc.languageende
dc.subject.ddcSozialwissenschaften, Soziologiede
dc.subject.ddcSocial sciences, sociology, anthropologyen
dc.subject.ddcPsychologyen
dc.subject.ddcPsychologiede
dc.titleDynamic reform of public institutions: a model of motivated agents and collective reputationde
dc.description.reviewbegutachtetde
dc.description.reviewrevieweden
dc.source.volumeSP II 2015-303rde
dc.publisher.countryDEU
dc.publisher.cityBerlinde
dc.source.seriesDiscussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels
dc.subject.classozApplied Psychologyen
dc.subject.classozangewandte Psychologiede
dc.subject.classozEinkommenspolitik, Lohnpolitik, Tarifpolitik, Vermögenspolitikde
dc.subject.classozIncome Policy, Property Policy, Wage Policyen
dc.subject.thesozMotivationde
dc.subject.thesozEffizienzde
dc.subject.thesozpublic serviceen
dc.subject.thesozefficiencyen
dc.subject.thesozöffentliche Dienstleistungde
dc.subject.thesozLeistungsanreizde
dc.subject.thesozwageen
dc.subject.thesozöffentlicher Sektorde
dc.subject.thesozpublic sectoren
dc.subject.thesozReputationde
dc.subject.thesozmotivationen
dc.subject.thesozwage increaseen
dc.subject.thesozKorruptionde
dc.subject.thesozreputationen
dc.subject.thesozcorruptionen
dc.subject.thesozincentiveen
dc.subject.thesozLohnde
dc.subject.thesozLohnerhöhungde
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-46218-v2-2
dc.rights.licenceDeposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitungde
dc.rights.licenceDeposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modificationsen
ssoar.contributor.institutionWZBde
internal.statusformal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossende
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dc.type.stockmonographde
dc.type.documentArbeitspapierde
dc.type.documentworking paperen
dc.source.pageinfo40de
internal.identifier.classoz11004
internal.identifier.classoz10709
internal.identifier.document3
dc.contributor.corporateeditorWissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
internal.identifier.corporateeditor381
internal.identifier.ddc150
internal.identifier.ddc300
dc.description.pubstatusPublished Versionen
dc.description.pubstatusVeröffentlichungsversionde
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internal.identifier.pubstatus1
internal.identifier.review2
internal.identifier.series920
dc.subject.classhort10700de
dc.subject.classhort11000de
dc.source.editionrev. versionde
internal.pdf.validfalse
internal.pdf.wellformedfalse
internal.pdf.ocrnull Page_4
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizerCERTAIN
internal.check.languageharmonizerCERTAIN_RETAINED


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