dc.contributor.author | Valasek, Justin | de |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-10-25T09:32:49Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-02-22T07:52:09Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-10-25T09:32:49Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | de |
dc.identifier.uri | http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/46218 | |
dc.description.abstract | State capacity is optimized when public institutions are staffed by individuals
with public-service motivation. However, when motivated agents value the collective
reputation of their place of employment, steady-state equilibria with both
high and low aggregate motivation (reputation) in the mission-oriented sector
exist. Reforming a low-motivation institution requires a non-monotonic wage
path: since the effect of higher wages on motivation is negative for a highreputation
institution, but positive for a low-reputation institution, a transition to
a high-reputation steady state requires an initial wage increase to crowd motivated
workers in, followed by a wage decrease to crowd non-motivated workers out. | en |
dc.language | en | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Social sciences, sociology, anthropology | en |
dc.subject.ddc | Psychology | en |
dc.subject.ddc | Psychologie | de |
dc.title | Dynamic reform of public institutions: a model of motivated agents and collective reputation | de |
dc.description.review | begutachtet | de |
dc.description.review | reviewed | en |
dc.source.volume | SP II 2015-303r | de |
dc.publisher.country | DEU | |
dc.publisher.city | Berlin | de |
dc.source.series | Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels | |
dc.subject.classoz | Applied Psychology | en |
dc.subject.classoz | angewandte Psychologie | de |
dc.subject.classoz | Einkommenspolitik, Lohnpolitik, Tarifpolitik, Vermögenspolitik | de |
dc.subject.classoz | Income Policy, Property Policy, Wage Policy | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Motivation | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | Effizienz | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | public service | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | efficiency | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | öffentliche Dienstleistung | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | Leistungsanreiz | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | wage | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | öffentlicher Sektor | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | public sector | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Reputation | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | motivation | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | wage increase | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Korruption | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | reputation | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | corruption | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | incentive | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Lohn | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | Lohnerhöhung | de |
dc.identifier.urn | urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-46218-v2-2 | |
dc.rights.licence | Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung | de |
dc.rights.licence | Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications | en |
ssoar.contributor.institution | WZB | de |
internal.status | formal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossen | de |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10041043 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10053534 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10047053 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10036462 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10041426 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10050933 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10038818 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10035631 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10051354 | |
dc.type.stock | monograph | de |
dc.type.document | Arbeitspapier | de |
dc.type.document | working paper | en |
dc.source.pageinfo | 40 | de |
internal.identifier.classoz | 11004 | |
internal.identifier.classoz | 10709 | |
internal.identifier.document | 3 | |
dc.contributor.corporateeditor | Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH | |
internal.identifier.corporateeditor | 381 | |
internal.identifier.ddc | 150 | |
internal.identifier.ddc | 300 | |
dc.description.pubstatus | Published Version | en |
dc.description.pubstatus | Veröffentlichungsversion | de |
internal.identifier.licence | 3 | |
internal.identifier.pubstatus | 1 | |
internal.identifier.review | 2 | |
internal.identifier.series | 920 | |
dc.subject.classhort | 10700 | de |
dc.subject.classhort | 11000 | de |
dc.source.edition | rev. version | de |
internal.pdf.valid | false | |
internal.pdf.wellformed | false | |
internal.pdf.ocr | null Page_4 | |
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizer | CERTAIN | |
internal.check.languageharmonizer | CERTAIN_RETAINED | |