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How to get truthful reporting in matching markets: a field experiment
[working paper]
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract We run a field experiment to test the truth-telling rates of the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles mechanism (TTC) under different information conditions. First, we asked first-year economics students enrolled in an introductory microeconomics unit about which topic, among three, they ... view more
We run a field experiment to test the truth-telling rates of the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles mechanism (TTC) under different information conditions. First, we asked first-year economics students enrolled in an introductory microeconomics unit about which topic, among three, they would most like to write an essay on. Most students chose the same favorite topic. Then we used TTC to distribute students equally across the three options. We ran three treatments varying the information the students received about the mechanism. In the first treatment students were given a description of the matching mechanism. In the second they received a description of the strategy-proofness of the mechanism without details of the mechanism. Finally, in the third they were given both pieces of information. We find a significant and positive effect of describing the strategy-proofness on truth-telling rates. On the other hand, describing the matching mechanism has a significant and negative effect on truth-telling rates. (author's abstract)... view less
Keywords
school choice; voting; experiment; truth; behavior
Classification
Social Psychology
Free Keywords
Feldversuch
Document language
English
Publication Year
2015
City
Berlin
Page/Pages
24 p.
Series
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2015-208
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/123701
Status
Published Version; reviewed
Licence
Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications