Exclusion in the all-pay auction: an experimental investigation

Fehr, Dietmar; Schmid, Julia

[working paper]

dc.contributor.author	Fehr, Dietmar	de
dc.contributor.author	Schmid, Julia	de
dc.date.accessioned	2016-02-16T08:25:36Z
dc.date.available	2016-02-16T08:25:36Z
dc.date.issued	2014	de
dc.identifier.uri	http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/46127
dc.description.abstract	Contest or auction designers who want to maximize the overall revenue are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of bidders with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the most able bidder in favor of greater homogeneity among the remaining bidders, even if the theoretical exclusion principle predicts otherwise. This is because the strongest bidders considerably overexert. A possible explanation is that these bidders are afraid they will regret a low but risky bid if they lose and thus prefer a strategy which gives them a lower but secure pay-off. (author's abstract)	en
dc.language	en	de
dc.subject.ddc	Wirtschaft	de
dc.subject.ddc	Economics	en
dc.title	Exclusion in the all-pay auction: an experimental investigation	de
dc.description.review	begutachtet	de
dc.description.review	reviewed	en
dc.source.volume	SP II 2014-206	de
dc.publisher.country	DEU
dc.publisher.city	Berlin	de
dc.source.series	Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten
dc.subject.classoz	National Economy	en
dc.subject.classoz	Volkswirtschaftstheorie	de
dc.subject.thesoz	Experiment	de
dc.subject.thesoz	experiment	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Wettbewerb	de
dc.subject.thesoz	competition	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Heterogenität	de
dc.subject.thesoz	heterogeneity	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Auktion	de
dc.subject.thesoz	auction	en
dc.rights.licence	Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung	de
dc.rights.licence	Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications	en
ssoar.contributor.institution	WZB	de
internal.status	formal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossen	de
internal.identifier.thesoz	10043015
internal.identifier.thesoz	10047904
internal.identifier.thesoz	10073824
internal.identifier.thesoz	10068068
dc.type.stock	monograph	de
dc.type.document	Arbeitspapier	de
dc.type.document	working paper	en
dc.source.pageinfo	30	de
internal.identifier.classoz	1090301
internal.identifier.document	3
dc.contributor.corporateeditor	Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
internal.identifier.corporateeditor	381
internal.identifier.ddc	330
dc.description.pubstatus	Veröffentlichungsversion	de
dc.description.pubstatus	Published Version	en
internal.identifier.licence	3
internal.identifier.pubstatus	1
internal.identifier.review	2
internal.identifier.series	961
dc.subject.classhort	10900	de
dc.identifier.handle	https://hdl.handle.net/10419/101452
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizer	CERTAIN

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