The influence of wages on public officials' corruptibility: a laboratory investigation

Veldhuizen, Roel van

[working paper]

dc.contributor.author	Veldhuizen, Roel van	de
dc.date.accessioned	2016-02-09T11:23:31Z
dc.date.available	2016-02-09T11:23:31Z
dc.date.issued	2013	de
dc.identifier.uri	http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/46063
dc.description.abstract	Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. The present paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials' wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, low-wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high-wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high-wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option. Additionally, the results suggest that a positive monitoring rate may be necessary for these effects to arise. (author's abstract)	en
dc.language	en	de
dc.subject.ddc	Sociology & anthropology	en
dc.subject.ddc	Soziologie, Anthropologie	de
dc.subject.other	experimentelle Ökonomie	de
dc.title	The influence of wages on public officials' corruptibility: a laboratory investigation	de
dc.description.review	begutachtet	de
dc.description.review	reviewed	en
dc.source.volume	SP II 2013-210	de
dc.publisher.country	DEU
dc.publisher.city	Berlin	de
dc.source.series	Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten
dc.subject.classoz	Criminal Sociology, Sociology of Law	en
dc.subject.classoz	Kriminalsoziologie, Rechtssoziologie, Kriminologie	de
dc.subject.thesoz	income effect	en
dc.subject.thesoz	wage	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Laborexperiment	de
dc.subject.thesoz	Einkommenseffekt	de
dc.subject.thesoz	laboratory experiment	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Korruption	de
dc.subject.thesoz	corruption	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Lohn	de
dc.rights.licence	Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung	de
dc.rights.licence	Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications	en
ssoar.contributor.institution	WZB	de
internal.status	formal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossen	de
internal.identifier.thesoz	10043016
internal.identifier.thesoz	10038818
internal.identifier.thesoz	10035631
internal.identifier.thesoz	10041657
dc.type.stock	monograph	de
dc.type.document	Arbeitspapier	de
dc.type.document	working paper	en
dc.source.pageinfo	41	de
internal.identifier.classoz	10214
internal.identifier.document	3
dc.contributor.corporateeditor	Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
internal.identifier.corporateeditor	381
internal.identifier.ddc	301
dc.description.pubstatus	Published Version	en
dc.description.pubstatus	Veröffentlichungsversion	de
internal.identifier.licence	3
internal.identifier.pubstatus	1
internal.identifier.review	2
internal.identifier.series	961
dc.subject.classhort	10200	de
dc.identifier.handle	https://hdl.handle.net/10419/86142
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizer	CERTAIN

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Kriminalsoziologie, Rechtssoziologie, Kriminologie
Criminal Sociology, Sociology of Law

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