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dc.contributor.authorVeldhuizen, Roel vande
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-09T11:23:31Z
dc.date.available2016-02-09T11:23:31Z
dc.date.issued2013de
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/46063
dc.description.abstractPrevious studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. The present paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials' wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, low-wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high-wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high-wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option. Additionally, the results suggest that a positive monitoring rate may be necessary for these effects to arise. (author's abstract)en
dc.languageende
dc.subject.ddcSociology & anthropologyen
dc.subject.ddcSoziologie, Anthropologiede
dc.subject.otherexperimentelle Ökonomiede
dc.titleThe influence of wages on public officials' corruptibility: a laboratory investigationde
dc.description.reviewbegutachtetde
dc.description.reviewrevieweden
dc.source.volumeSP II 2013-210de
dc.publisher.countryDEU
dc.publisher.cityBerlinde
dc.source.seriesDiscussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten
dc.subject.classozCriminal Sociology, Sociology of Lawen
dc.subject.classozKriminalsoziologie, Rechtssoziologie, Kriminologiede
dc.subject.thesozincome effecten
dc.subject.thesozwageen
dc.subject.thesozLaborexperimentde
dc.subject.thesozEinkommenseffektde
dc.subject.thesozlaboratory experimenten
dc.subject.thesozKorruptionde
dc.subject.thesozcorruptionen
dc.subject.thesozLohnde
dc.rights.licenceDeposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitungde
dc.rights.licenceDeposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modificationsen
ssoar.contributor.institutionWZBde
internal.statusformal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossende
internal.identifier.thesoz10043016
internal.identifier.thesoz10038818
internal.identifier.thesoz10035631
internal.identifier.thesoz10041657
dc.type.stockmonographde
dc.type.documentArbeitspapierde
dc.type.documentworking paperen
dc.source.pageinfo41de
internal.identifier.classoz10214
internal.identifier.document3
dc.contributor.corporateeditorWissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
internal.identifier.corporateeditor381
internal.identifier.ddc301
dc.description.pubstatusPublished Versionen
dc.description.pubstatusVeröffentlichungsversionde
internal.identifier.licence3
internal.identifier.pubstatus1
internal.identifier.review2
internal.identifier.series961
dc.subject.classhort10200de
dc.identifier.handlehttps://hdl.handle.net/10419/86142
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizerCERTAIN


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