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dc.contributor.authorWurster, Stefande
dc.date.accessioned2015-11-04T09:38:55Z
dc.date.available2015-11-04T09:38:55Z
dc.date.issued2015de
dc.identifier.issn2297-6477de
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/45226
dc.description.abstractThis paper tries to identify the fiscal sustainability record of democratically and autocratically governed countries by applying various performance indicators (credit worthiness, payment defaults, national debt, foreign assets) and also to clarify what effect the characteristics of a regime have on consolidation efforts in a country. The study identifies two key findings. While in the past, democracies have clearly found it easier to preserve their credit standing and solvency and to avoid government bankruptcy, a similar advantage can no longer be detected for democracies in terms of reducing national debt and foreign debts. Why democracies, in spite of their arrangements with a sensitivity for the public good and for due process, are finding it so difficult to avoid shifting their debts to future generations, to undertake cutback measures and to provide sufficient financial foresight, can in principle be interpreted as the other side of the coin, namely highly presence-oriented interests boosted even further through the short "democracy-specific time horizon".en
dc.languageende
dc.subject.ddcStaatsformen und Regierungssystemede
dc.subject.ddcWirtschaftde
dc.subject.ddcSystems of governments & statesen
dc.subject.ddcEconomicsen
dc.titleSustainability of Fiscal Policy in Democracies and Autocraciesde
dc.description.reviewbegutachtet (peer reviewed)de
dc.description.reviewpeer revieweden
dc.identifier.urlhttp://www.librelloph.com/challengesinsustainability/article/view/cis-3.1.1de
dc.source.journalChallenges in Sustainability
dc.source.volume3de
dc.publisher.countryCHE
dc.source.issue1de
dc.subject.classozStaat, staatliche Organisationsformende
dc.subject.classozEconomic Policyen
dc.subject.classozPolitical System, Constitution, Governmenten
dc.subject.classozWirtschaftspolitikde
dc.subject.thesozpolitisches Systemde
dc.subject.thesozbudget consolidationen
dc.subject.thesozdictatorshipen
dc.subject.thesozBonitätde
dc.subject.thesozDemokratiede
dc.subject.thesozsustainabilityen
dc.subject.thesoznational debten
dc.subject.thesozFinanzpolitikde
dc.subject.thesozsolvencyen
dc.subject.thesozSparpolitikde
dc.subject.thesozdemocracyen
dc.subject.thesozStaatsverschuldungde
dc.subject.thesozDiktaturde
dc.subject.thesozpolitical systemen
dc.subject.thesozInflationde
dc.subject.thesozNachhaltigkeitde
dc.subject.thesozinflationen
dc.subject.thesozSteueraufkommende
dc.subject.thesozfiscal policyen
dc.subject.thesozHaushaltskonsolidierungde
dc.subject.thesoztax revenueen
dc.subject.thesozausterity policyen
dc.rights.licenceCreative Commons - Attribution 4.0en
dc.rights.licenceCreative Commons - Namensnennung 4.0de
internal.statusformal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossende
internal.identifier.thesoz10059274
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dc.type.stockarticlede
dc.type.documentjournal articleen
dc.type.documentZeitschriftenartikelde
dc.source.pageinfo1-15de
internal.identifier.classoz10503
internal.identifier.classoz1090302
internal.identifier.journal795
internal.identifier.document32
internal.identifier.ddc321
internal.identifier.ddc330
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.12924/cis2015.03010001de
dc.description.pubstatusPublished Versionen
dc.description.pubstatusVeröffentlichungsversionde
internal.identifier.licence16
internal.identifier.pubstatus1
internal.identifier.review1
dc.description.misccis-3-1-1de
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizerCERTAIN


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