A theory of optimal green defaults

Meran, Georg; Schwarze, Reimund

[working paper]

dc.contributor.author	Meran, Georg	de
dc.contributor.author	Schwarze, Reimund	de
dc.date.accessioned	2015-04-08T12:59:17Z
dc.date.available	2015-04-08T12:59:17Z
dc.date.issued	2015	de
dc.identifier.issn	1436-140X	de
dc.identifier.uri	http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/42538
dc.description.abstract	This paper develops an analytical framework for studying the Baumol-Oates efficiency of traditional single instrument abatementpolicies vis-à-vis green defaults in the face of price inertia and deliberate defaultingby subpopulations. In this special case ofbehavioural heterogeneity, command and control approaches can outperform price-based instruments while pure tax/subsidy schemes need tobe adjusted in order to achievepolitically desired levels of abatement. We also prove that choice-preserving nudges are superior to any single-instrument policy in this case. An average marginal abatement cost rule is developed to optimise the green defaults and traditional policies of standards and prices under different degrees of market rigidity.	en
dc.language	en	de
dc.subject.ddc	Ökologie	de
dc.subject.ddc	Ecology	en
dc.subject.ddc	Politikwissenschaft	de
dc.subject.ddc	Political science	en
dc.title	A theory of optimal green defaults	de
dc.description.review	begutachtet	de
dc.description.review	reviewed	en
dc.source.volume	6/2015	de
dc.publisher.country	DEU
dc.publisher.city	Leipzig	de
dc.source.series	UFZ Discussion Papers
dc.subject.classoz	Special areas of Departmental Policy	en
dc.subject.classoz	spezielle Ressortpolitik	de
dc.subject.classoz	Ökologie und Umwelt	de
dc.subject.classoz	Ecology, Environment	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Subvention	de
dc.subject.thesoz	subsidy	en
dc.subject.thesoz	environment tax	en
dc.subject.thesoz	environmental economy	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Verteilungseffekt	de
dc.subject.thesoz	Regulierung	de
dc.subject.thesoz	distribution impact	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Umweltökonomie	de
dc.subject.thesoz	environmental directive	en
dc.subject.thesoz	regulation	en
dc.subject.thesoz	environmental policy	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Umweltschutzauflage	de
dc.subject.thesoz	Umweltpolitik	de
dc.subject.thesoz	Ökosteuer	de
dc.subject.thesoz	Umweltschutz	de
dc.subject.thesoz	environmental protection	en
dc.identifier.urn	urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-425382
dc.rights.licence	Creative Commons - Namensnennung, Nicht-kommerz., Weitergabe unter gleichen Bedingungen	de
dc.rights.licence	Creative Commons - Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike	en
ssoar.contributor.institution	Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung - UFZ	de
internal.status	formal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossen	de
internal.identifier.thesoz	10058914
internal.identifier.thesoz	10034829
internal.identifier.thesoz	10047146
internal.identifier.thesoz	10039952
internal.identifier.thesoz	10061482
internal.identifier.thesoz	10060617
internal.identifier.thesoz	10050435
internal.identifier.thesoz	10060588
dc.type.stock	monograph	de
dc.type.document	Arbeitspapier	de
dc.type.document	working paper	en
dc.source.pageinfo	16	de
internal.identifier.classoz	10508
internal.identifier.classoz	20900
internal.identifier.document	3
dc.contributor.corporateeditor	Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung - UFZ
internal.identifier.corporateeditor	483
internal.identifier.ddc	320
internal.identifier.ddc	577
dc.description.pubstatus	Published Version	en
dc.description.pubstatus	Veröffentlichungsversion	de
internal.identifier.licence	11
internal.identifier.pubstatus	1
internal.identifier.review	2
internal.identifier.series	737
internal.pdf.version	1.6
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizer	CERTAIN
internal.check.languageharmonizer	CERTAIN_RETAINED

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spezielle Ressortpolitik
Special areas of Departmental Policy
Ökologie und Umwelt
Ecology, Environment

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