Die begrenzte Rationalität von Delegation und Steuerung in der Bundesverwaltung

The limited rationality of delegation and control in the federal administration
[collection article]

Keywords
political control; government agency; Federal Administration; bureaucracy; Federal Republic of Germany; political governance; public administration; principal-agent-theory; United States of America

Classification
Political System, Constitution, Government
Administrative Science
Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture

Method
descriptive study

Collection Title
Mechanismen der Politik: strategische Interaktionen im deutschen Regierungssystem

Editor
Ganghof, Steffen; Manow, Philip

Document language
German

Publication Year
2005

Publisher
Campus Verl.

City
Frankfurt am Main

Page/Pages
p. 215-243

Series
Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 54

ISBN
3-593-37701-2

Status
Published Version; reviewed

Licence
Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications

Data providerThis metadata entry was indexed by the Special Subject Collection Social Sciences, USB Cologne