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Die begrenzte Rationalität von Delegation und Steuerung in der Bundesverwaltung
The limited rationality of delegation and control in the federal administration
[collection article]
Keywords
political control; government agency; Federal Administration; bureaucracy; Federal Republic of Germany; political governance; public administration; principal-agent-theory; United States of America
Classification
Political System, Constitution, Government
Administrative Science
Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture
Method
descriptive study
Collection Title
Mechanismen der Politik: strategische Interaktionen im deutschen Regierungssystem
Editor
Ganghof, Steffen; Manow, Philip
Document language
German
Publication Year
2005
Publisher
Campus Verl.
City
Frankfurt am Main
Page/Pages
p. 215-243
Series
Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 54
ISBN
3-593-37701-2
Status
Published Version; reviewed
Licence
Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications
Data providerThis metadata entry was indexed by the Special Subject Collection Social Sciences, USB Cologne