dc.contributor.author | Gaylord, Sylvia | de |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-04-09T12:17:32Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-04-09T12:17:32Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | de |
dc.identifier.issn | 1868-4890 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/33814 | |
dc.description.abstract | Discipline and cohesiveness of political parties are essential for legislatures to
engage in policy-making. Parties in Brazil have historically been considered ideologically
weak and uninvolved in policy issues of national importance. Analyses of roll-call
votes, however, have shown that parties can be disciplined government supporters.
This paper tests the claim that Brazilian parties have also become programmatic actors
in their own right. The paper uses statutory delegation content to test whether voting
discipline translates into greater influence on the substance of legislation. The
data analysis shows that party unity among parties of the government coalition does
not affect statutory content. Opposition parties, by contrast, are more likely to
reduce the executive’s discretion when they are more unified. Overall, the support
for the hypothesis of programmatic parties is weak, given that executive authorship
is the strongest determinant of statutory content. | en |
dc.description.abstract | La disciplina y coherencia internas de los partidos políticos es fundamental para
que las legislaturas cumplan con la función de elaboración de políticas públicas.
Los partidos brasilenos han sido históricamente considerados débiles ideológicamente
y poco involucrados en políticas de importancia nacional. Análisis de votaciones nominales,
sin embargo, han mostrado que los partidos pueden brindar apoyos disciplinados al
gobierno. Este artículo pone a prueba la hipótesis de que, además de tener disciplina
a la hora del voto, los partidos han desarrollado un mayor compromiso con el contenido
programático de las políticas públicas. El resultado principal del análisis de contenido
de una muestra aleatoria de leyes ordinarias es contrario a la hipótesis en cuestión,
dado que el poder ejecutivo es el principal determinante del contenido de las leyes.
Sin embargo, los partidos de oposición están en condiciones de reducir la discrecionalidad
ejecutiva cuando se encuentran más unidos. | es |
dc.subject.ddc | Politikwissenschaft | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Political science | en |
dc.title | Too Undisciplined to Legislate? Party Unity and Policy-making in Brazil | de |
dc.title.alternative | Demasiado indisciplinados para gobernar? Unidad partidaria y elaboración de políticas
en Brasil | de |
dc.description.review | begutachtet (peer reviewed) | de |
dc.description.review | peer reviewed | en |
dc.source.journal | Journal of Politics in Latin America | |
dc.source.volume | 4 | de |
dc.publisher.country | DEU | |
dc.source.issue | 3 | de |
dc.subject.classoz | Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture | en |
dc.subject.classoz | politische Willensbildung, politische Soziologie, politische Kultur | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | Brasilien | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | Brazil | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | politische Faktoren | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | political factors | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | politische Folgen | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | political impact | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | politische Führung | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | political leadership | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | politische Kultur | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | political culture | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Gesetzgebung | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | legislation | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Partei | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | party | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Parteidisziplin | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | party discipline | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Parteipolitik | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | party politics | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Südamerika | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | South America | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Entwicklungsland | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | developing country | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Lateinamerika | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | Latin America | en |
dc.identifier.urn | urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-5645 | de |
dc.rights.licence | Creative Commons - Namensnennung, Nicht kommerz., Keine Bearbeitung | de |
dc.rights.licence | Creative Commons - Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works | en |
ssoar.gesis.collection | aDIS | de |
ssoar.contributor.institution | GIGA | |
internal.status | formal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossen | de |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10039751 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10053636 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10043854 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10044464 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10050182 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10036234 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10036000 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10054127 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10054149 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10035556 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10034610 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10035406 | |
dc.type.stock | article | de |
dc.type.document | Zeitschriftenartikel | de |
dc.type.document | journal article | en |
dc.source.pageinfo | 39-65 | de |
internal.identifier.classoz | 10504 | |
internal.identifier.journal | 202 | |
internal.identifier.document | 32 | |
internal.identifier.ddc | 320 | |
dc.subject.methods | empirisch | de |
dc.subject.methods | empirical | en |
dc.description.pubstatus | Veröffentlichungsversion | de |
dc.description.pubstatus | Published Version | en |
internal.identifier.licence | 2 | |
internal.identifier.methods | 4 | |
internal.identifier.pubstatus | 1 | |
internal.identifier.review | 1 | |
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizer | CERTAIN | |