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Convergence in the finite Cournot oligopoly with social and individual learning

[Zeitschriftenartikel]

Vallée, Thomas
Yildizoğlu, Murat

Abstract

Convergence to the Nash equilibrium in a Cournot oligopoly is a question that recurrently arises as a subject of controversy in economics. The development of evolutionary game theory has provided an equilibrium concept more directly connected with adjustment dynamics, and the evolutionary stability ... mehr

Convergence to the Nash equilibrium in a Cournot oligopoly is a question that recurrently arises as a subject of controversy in economics. The development of evolutionary game theory has provided an equilibrium concept more directly connected with adjustment dynamics, and the evolutionary stability of the equilibria of the Cournot game has been extensively studied in the literature. Sev- eral articles show that the Walrasian equilibrium is the stable ESS of the Cournot game. But no general result has been established for the difficult case of simultaneous heterogenous mutations. Authors propose specific selection dynamics to analyze this case. Vriend (2000) proposes using a genetic algorithm for studying learning dynamics in this game and obtains convergence to Cournot equilibrium with individual learning. The resulting convergence has been questioned by Arifovic and Maschek (2006). The aim of this article is to clarify this controversy. It analyzes the mechanisms that are behind these contradictory results and underlines the specific role of the spite effect. We show why social learning gives rise to the Walrasian equilibrium and why, in a general setup, individual learning can effectively yield convergence to the Cournot equilibrium. We also illustrate these general results by systematic computational experiments.... weniger

Thesaurusschlagwörter
Evolution

Klassifikation
Volkswirtschaftslehre

Freie Schlagwörter
L130; L200; D430; C630; C730; Cournot oligopoly; Learning; Selection; Evolutionary stability; Nash equilibrium; Genetic algorithms

Sprache Dokument
Englisch

Publikationsjahr
2009

Seitenangabe
670–690 S.

Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 72 (2009) 2

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.07.007

Status
Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)

Lizenz
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)


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