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Take it or leave it for something better? Responses to fair offers in ultimatum bargaining
[journal article]
Abstract We investigated if responders accept a 50-50 split in a modified version of the ultimatum game, in which rejection yields a higher payoff (€7) than accepting the equal offer (€5). Therefore, the decision to accept the 50-50 split in this modified ultimatum game cannot be perceived as a self-interest... view more
We investigated if responders accept a 50-50 split in a modified version of the ultimatum game, in which rejection yields a higher payoff (€7) than accepting the equal offer (€5). Therefore, the decision to accept the 50-50 split in this modified ultimatum game cannot be perceived as a self-interest act, as opposed to the standard game, in which acceptance may reflect resignation in the knowledge that the equal split is the best one can expect. A substantial proportion of responders accepts the equal split in this modified game (Study 1), which clearly establishes egalitarian preferences. Further studies show that the willingness to accept is not an artifact of indifference towards the extra payoff (Study 2), but reflects true concerns for proposers’ outcomes (Study 3).... view less
Classification
Social Psychology
Free Keywords
Decision making; Ultimatum games; Inequality aversion; Non-selfish motives; Social utility; Other-regarding preferences; Reciprocity
Document language
English
Publication Year
2009
Page/Pages
p. 1227-1231
Journal
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45 (2009) 6
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.06.004
Status
Postprint; peer reviewed
Licence
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)