Bibtex export
@article{ Koch2009, title = {Career concerns incentives: an experimental test}, author = {Koch, Alexander K. and Morgenstern, Albrecht and Raab, Philippe}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, number = {1}, pages = {571–588}, volume = {72}, year = {2009}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.014}, urn = {https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-293040}, abstract = {Holmström's (1982/99) career concerns model has become a workhorse for analyzing agency issues in many elds. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way, which is difficult to directly test with eld data: typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on. Our laboratory experiment provides prima facie evidence: i) the signal jamming mechanism successfully creates incentives on the labor supply side; ii) decision errors take time to decrease; iii) while subjects' average beliefs are remarkably consistent with play, a mild winner's curse arises on the labor demand side.}, keywords = {Reputation; reputation}}