Career concerns incentives: an experimental test

Koch, Alexander K.; Morgenstern, Albrecht; Raab, Philippe

[journal article]

dc.contributor.author	Koch, Alexander K.	de
dc.contributor.author	Morgenstern, Albrecht	de
dc.contributor.author	Raab, Philippe	de
dc.date.accessioned	2012-05-03T02:55:00Z	de
dc.date.accessioned	2012-08-29T23:07:12Z
dc.date.available	2012-08-29T23:07:12Z
dc.date.issued	2009	de
dc.identifier.uri	http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/29304
dc.description.abstract	Holmström's (1982/99) career concerns model has become a workhorse for analyzing agency issues in many elds. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way, which is difficult to directly test with eld data: typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on. Our laboratory experiment provides prima facie evidence: i) the signal jamming mechanism successfully creates incentives on the labor supply side; ii) decision errors take time to decrease; iii) while subjects' average beliefs are remarkably consistent with play, a mild winner's curse arises on the labor demand side.	en
dc.language	en	de
dc.subject.ddc	Wirtschaft	de
dc.subject.ddc	Economics	en
dc.subject.other	C91; D83; L14; Incentives; Career concerns; Signal jamming; Experiments
dc.title	Career concerns incentives: an experimental test	en
dc.description.review	begutachtet (peer reviewed)	de
dc.description.review	peer reviewed	en
dc.source.journal	Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization	de
dc.source.volume	72	de
dc.publisher.country	NLD
dc.source.issue	1	de
dc.subject.classoz	Basic Research, General Concepts and History of Economics	en
dc.subject.classoz	Allgemeines, spezielle Theorien und Schulen, Methoden, Entwicklung und Geschichte der Wirtschaftswissenschaften	de
dc.subject.thesoz	Reputation	de
dc.subject.thesoz	reputation	en
dc.identifier.urn	urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-293040	de
dc.date.modified	2012-05-10T16:21:00Z	de
dc.rights.licence	PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)	de
dc.rights.licence	PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)	en
ssoar.gesis.collection	SOLIS;ADIS	de
ssoar.contributor.institution	http://www.peerproject.eu/	de
internal.status	3	de
internal.identifier.thesoz	10047053
dc.type.stock	article	de
dc.type.document	journal article	en
dc.type.document	Zeitschriftenartikel	de
dc.rights.copyright	f	de
dc.source.pageinfo	571–588
internal.identifier.classoz	10901
internal.identifier.journal	196	de
internal.identifier.document	32
internal.identifier.ddc	330
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.014	de
dc.description.pubstatus	Postprint	en
dc.description.pubstatus	Postprint	de
internal.identifier.licence	7
internal.identifier.pubstatus	2
internal.identifier.review	1
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizer	CERTAIN
internal.check.languageharmonizer	CERTAIN_RETAINED

Files in this item

Name:: ssoar-jebo-2009-1-koch_et_al-c ...
Size:: 448.4Kb
Format:: PDF

View/Open

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Allgemeines, spezielle Theorien und "Schulen", Methoden, Entwicklung und Geschichte der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Basic Research, General Concepts and History of Economics

Show simple item record