Conformity and out of equilibrium beliefs

Cartwright, Edward

Bibtex export

@article{ Cartwright2009,
 title = {Conformity and out of equilibrium beliefs},
 author = {Cartwright, Edward},
 journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization},
 number = {1-2},
 pages = {164-185},
 volume = {70},
 year = {2009},
 doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.003},
 urn = {https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-292156},
 abstract = {We analyze a model of conformity with contrasting inferences. Given a form of ‘strong inferences’, any non-conforming agent is believed to have ‘extreme preferences’ and can expect to receive low esteem. With a weaker form of inferences, a non-conforming agent could be inferred to have ‘average preferences’ and can expect a smaller fall in esteem. We find that the type of inferences need not influence whether a conformist equilibrium exists. It will, however, impact on the size of the set of conformist equilibria and thus weakening inferences acts as an equilibrium selection device.},
}