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[journal article]

dc.contributor.authorDasgupta, Amilde
dc.contributor.authorSarafidis, Yianisde
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-19T02:50:00Zde
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-29T23:10:19Z
dc.date.available2012-08-29T23:10:19Z
dc.date.issued2009de
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/28295
dc.description.abstractIn many firms managers play the role of administrators, adding value by successfully implementing solutions to problems that the firm may face. We model the career concerns of administrators. When administrators receive the same in formation but differ in their administrative abilities, we show that they may not choose tasks that are appropriate for the problems they face. In particular, in any pure strategy equilibrium of our model, administrators do not condition their behavior on any of their private information, despite the fact that they are risk neutral and know their administrative ability. We thus identify a novel source of incentive conflicts in firms. We also examine the robustness of these results to various extensions.en
dc.languageende
dc.subject.ddcWirtschaftde
dc.subject.ddcEconomicsen
dc.subject.otherD82; C72; incentive conflicts; ccareer concerns; conformism
dc.titleManagers as administrators: reputation and incentivesen
dc.description.reviewbegutachtet (peer reviewed)de
dc.description.reviewpeer revieweden
dc.source.journalJournal of Economic Behavior & Organizationde
dc.source.volume70de
dc.publisher.countryNLD
dc.source.issue1-2de
dc.subject.classozManagement Scienceen
dc.subject.classozManagementde
dc.subject.thesozReputationde
dc.subject.thesozreputationen
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-282956de
dc.date.modified2012-01-19T09:58:00Zde
dc.rights.licencePEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)de
dc.rights.licencePEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)en
ssoar.gesis.collectionSOLIS;ADISde
ssoar.contributor.institutionhttp://www.peerproject.eu/de
internal.status3de
internal.identifier.thesoz10047053
dc.type.stockarticlede
dc.type.documentjournal articleen
dc.type.documentZeitschriftenartikelde
dc.rights.copyrightfde
dc.source.pageinfo155-163
internal.identifier.classoz1090401
internal.identifier.journal196de
internal.identifier.document32
internal.identifier.ddc330
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.12.009de
dc.description.pubstatusPostprinten
dc.description.pubstatusPostprintde
internal.identifier.licence7
internal.identifier.pubstatus2
internal.identifier.review1
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizerCERTAIN
internal.check.languageharmonizerCERTAIN_RETAINED


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